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n two successive weeks—November 5, 1999 and
November 10, 1999—the Philippines' Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued
press releases arguing strongly against a total logging ban.
Of the two press releases, the November 5 issuance is the
more interesting. It specifies the nature of the cost burden
that would be imposed on society following a ban on com-
mercial logging. It says:
"...the logging ban has substantial direct and in-
direct costs, to wit:
Reduction in welfare of both consumers and pro-
ducers due to lower wood supply;
The foreign exchange outflow needed to purchase
timber and processed wood imports to meet growing
domestic requirements;
Opportunities lost because of slower adoption
of conservation practices;
The fiscal impact of increases in the direct cost
of monitoring and enforcement by forest authorities
and the cost of generating alternative livelihood activi-
ties that would deliberately keep forest extraction at
nonprofit subsistence level; and
Off-site, environmental damages associated with
increase in illegal activities (delos Angeles and Oliva
1995)."
A logging ban would certainly seem to be a draconian
measure. But consider this. A de facto logging ban will even-
tually occur through a shortage in the forest resources in
the Philippines in the future. And even before this happens,
the sensitive tropical rain forests of the Philippines will suf-
fer considerable damage. Such damage will exert many costs
on producers in other sectors and on nontimber forest us-
ers. It may also hold global consequences. Unlike countries
like Papua New Guinea and Vietnam which lag behind in the
commercial exploitation and regulation of forests, the Phil-
ippines has already attempted to implement an export ban
on logs and numerous other regulatory policies aimed at
reducing deforestation. Unfortunately, all these failed. Thus,
with the failure of these past policies, combined with con- I2
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tinued deforestation of about one percent1 per year, the
option of a complete logging ban has been considered in
mainstream political debate.
Four major bills curtailing commercial logging, for in-
stance, were being considered by the House of Representa-
tives as of last quarter last year while three major bills have
been pending before the Senate. Two of the Senate bills
seek to reform the logging system through a community-
based forest stock management while the other aims to
identify and demarcate forest lands and the resources there
that cannot be diminished.
At present, the pending bills appear to recede from
considering a total logging ban and have embraced many
multi-objective bills with some form of logging bans, some
of which conflict with one another. The perceived high eco-
nomic displacement costs and the difficulty of enforcing a
total ban are apparently exerting pressures on our legisla-
tors.
Inasmuch as the economic impact of banning com-
mercial logging remains as the key barrier to having a deci-
sive action on the part of the legislators, this paper attempts
to quantify the costs of a moratorium on commercial log-
ging using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.2
The results of the computation, as this Policy Notes
issue will show, indicate that the economic consequences
are not as drastic as suggested in earlier studies and in the
DENR press release.
Computing the cost of banning commercial
logging
Two policy tests with full and less than full employ-
ment scenarios were carried out. The corresponding eco-
nomic consequences or
welfare changes were then
obtained.
The first test is a to-
tal ban on commercial log-
ging and the second is a
total ban on commercial
logging accompanied by an
across-the-board reduction
of import tariffs.3 Some of the direct and indirect costs shown
in the DENR November 5 press release were also estimated
by this paper. Welfare losses to domestic consumers due
to the imposition of a ban on commercial logging, for in-
stance, as well as the decrease in employment generated
by the ban and the reduction in tariffs, and the foreign ex-
change requirements in the importation of the domestic
needs in logs were computed.
Results
In terms of the first indirect cost, Table 1 reports the
changes in welfare due to a ban on commercial logging. The
results under the full employment of labor assumption4 re-
veal that the reduction in welfare under a ban is P15.3 bil-
lion while under a combined ban and tariff reduction, the
decrease in welfare is only P8.6 billion. Meanwhile, under a
less than full labor employment assumption,5 which is more
reflective of the labor market situation in the country, the
corresponding reductions in welfare are P15.8 billion and
P8.9 billion, respectively. The worst scenario therefore shows
a total economic loss of less than P16.0 billion.
————————
1The rate depends on the source. Repetto and Gillis (1988) report
0.7 percent while the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
of the Philippines reports 1.49 percent for 1996. The rate could have
accelerated from 1988 to 1996.
2CGE model is a tool suited for analyzing environmental policies
using an economic framework as it operationalizes the neoclassical
microeconomic and welfare economic theories.
3The second test simulates the effects on the economy of a total log
ban as well as the current government policy of liberalizing trade by re-
ducing tariffs to a uniform rate of 5 percent by year 2004.
4A neoclassical assumption wherein wages adjust to ensure full em-
ployment.
5A Keynesian assumption which allows for unemployment in the
economy.
Change -15.28 -8.60 -15.84 -8.92
in welfare
Ban on Commercial Ban on Commercial Ban on Commercial Ban on Commercial
Logging (with full Logging and Reduction Logging (less than Logging and Reduction
employment) in Tariffs (with full full employment) in Tariffs (less than
employment) full employment)
Table 1. Measure of Social Welfare (Billion pesos)3
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As to the problem of foreign exchange outflow that
may arise due to the need to purchase timber and processed
wood to meet the domestic needs, Table 2 indicates that
there would indeed be an increase in foreign exchange re-
quirements as the value of imports of forestry products is
shown to increase. However, because of the declining value
of the peso, the country's exports become cheaper and the
demand for them goes up as shown in the increased vol-
ume of total exports. This increase in exports would pro-
vide the foreign exchange needed to import more logs.
The third indirect cost mentioned in the DENR press
release is difficult to quantify. The argument DENR is mak-
ing is that if logging is banned, conservation or better log-
ging practices will not be adopted. A total logging ban may
not be desired by the DENR but it does achieve conservation.
A similar argument can be made for the fourth indi-
rect cost identified by the DENR. The argument by the De-
partment is that enforcement costs would increase consid-
erably. In short, it claims that it would be more costly to
enforce a total ban than to enforce a 'community-based log-
ging.' This, however, remains to be seen. It can be argued
that there is nothing simpler than to enforce a total ban
since anyone in possession of a recently-cut tree is in viola-
tion of the policy and should be prosecuted.
The second part of the fourth indirect cost, i.e., cost
of generating alternative livelihood, is easier to quantify.
This deals with generating alternative employment. The re-
sults of our policy simulation show that the economy ad-
justs to provide jobs in other sectors. Table 3 shows that
total employment declines by 1.77 and 1.11 percent, re-
spectively, for the two scenarios with less than full employ-
ment assumption. Although this is not a negligible loss of
jobs, it is considerably smaller than earlier estimates of delos
Angeles and Oliva (1995).
Meanwhile, this study was unable to quantify the fifth
indirect cost mentioned by DENR. The DENR suggests that
under a ban, illegal logging increases and that it is more
environmentally detrimental than legal logging. Illegal log-
ging is indeed detrimental to the environment. But so is
legal logging. If legal logging ceases under a ban, there
should be a net environmental improvement. And the losses
in consumer welfare from a ban on logging shrink when they
are reduced by the environmental gains accrued by halting
the harvest.
Logging—legal or otherwise—generates significant
emissions of BOD5, suspended solids, nitrates and phos-
phates emissions, all by-products of erosion. With a ban on
logging, these emissions would be reduced. The value of
this reduction in emissions is quantified in the Master Plan
for Forestry Development (MPFD 1990).
The MPFD calculates the total cost of erosion that
resulted from the 1988 annual harvest to be P11.6 billion,
broken down into P6.7 billion for off-site damages and P4.9
billion for on-site damages (adjusted to eliminate double
counting of costs). The largest off-site impacts are on irri-
gated agriculture, municipal fishing and hydro energy while
the largest on-site impacts are on extensive agriculture and
extensive grass.
Value of imports 5,405.30 5,600.87 5,693.55 5,574.08 5,676.47
(million US$)
Value of forestry 45.28 354.86 341.92 354.02 341.43
imports (million
US$)
Value of exports 5,660.85 5,832.96 5,916.71 5,806.15 5,900.56
(million US$)
Exchange 40.00 44.09 45.91 44.07 45.90
Pesos per US$
Base Ban on Commercial Ban on Commercial Ban on Commercial Ban on Commercial
Logging (with full Logging and Reduction Logging (less than Logging and Reduction
employment) in Tariffs (with full full employment) in Tariffs (less than
employment) full employment)
Table 2. Philippine Imports and Exports4
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The 1988 social accounts matrix was used to cali-
brate the CGE model. The amount calculated—at P11.6 bil-
lion—compares favorably with the welfare loss of P15.8 bil-
lion under the worst case. If the scenario with import tariff
reduction is considered, then the off-site and on-site dam-
ages that would no longer be experienced following a ban
on commercial harvesting would more than offset the wel-
fare loss.
Conclusion
As gleaned from the results, this Notes makes a case
for a ban on commercial logging in the Philippines for at
least a cycle (say 30 years). The merit of the case rests on
a comparison of the welfare loss for consumers resulting
from a ban with the benefits to consumers derived from
allowing the harvest to continue in some form. Results show
that there are more benefits to society from halting the har-
vest than from allowing it to continue. As noted in the re-
sults of the tests on alternative policies reducing the cut as
well as reducing the import tariffs for logs, no policy other
than a ban can halt the total destruction of the forests. A
ban is also easy to enforce. It is harder to sell this idea to
people who make a wealthy livelihood out of foresting but
the numbers can tell: the losses to the economy of banning
commercial harvesting are more than recovered in terms of
the avoided off- and on-site damages from erosion. The net
cost of banning the harvest is negative.
A ban on commercial logging, however, does not mean
a ban on traditional forest-based economic activities since
the take in logs from these activities is small. In fact, a ban
would protect the traditional foresters more than a social
foresting approach as advocated by the MPFD. Allowing tra-
ditional forest harvesting to continue is not synonymous to
switching from commercial forestry to social foresting. In
its recommendation for social forestry, the MPFD virtually
allows the same extent of extraction of trees but with the
major difference of having
communities manage the
process. Its argument is that
social forestry will give com-
munities incentives to harvest
for a sustained future. At the
same time, it will continue to
impose the ban on exports.
In our estimation, how-
ever, the combination of banning exports and turning the
management over to social groups or communities is a
double tragedy of the commons. For one, the export ban
eliminates the need to use international prices as a signal
that the cost of producing goods using domestic logs is not
efficient (Vincent 1992). And two, the conversion to social
foresting eliminates the need to produce profits. Thus, the
proposal in the MPFD will simply accelerate the destruction
of the forest in the Philippines and will be more disastrous
to the economy than a ban enforced immediately.
The issue for decisionmakers therefore is clear. They
should decide on who should and will benefit from the for-
est—the few who have up to now benefited or the genera-
tions of Filipinos to follow?  4 4
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in Labor
Employment
With Full Employment With Less Than Full Employment
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